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Abstract: A 'democratic recession' is to be observed, which is not restricted to Sub-Sahara Afri-
ca. It went along with the rise of populist new nationalism and lack of regard of the concerned 
for the need to defend democracy actively. On the other hand, recent examples of African social 
movements that successfully campaigned for a democratic renaissance in Africa and elsewhere 
are promising indicators of progressive social forces that counteract global trends of the resur-
gence of right-wing nationalism and autocratic rule.   
 
Résumé : On observe une « récession démocratique » qui ne se limite pas à l’Afrique subsaha-
rienne. Cela a coïncidé avec la montée d'un nouveau nationalisme populiste et le manque de vi-
gilance des personnes concernées quant à la nécessité de défendre activement la démocratie. 
D'autre part, des exemples récents de mouvements sociaux africains qui ont mené avec succès 
une renaissance démocratique en Afrique et ailleurs sont des indicateurs prometteurs de forces 
sociales progressistes qui vont à l’encontre des tendances mondiales à la résurgence d’un natio-
nalisme de droite et des régimes autocratiques.   
 
Zusammenfassung : Es ist eine "demokratische Rezession" zu beobachten, die sich nicht nur 
auf Afrika südlich der Sahara beschränkt. Dies geht einher mit dem Aufkommen eines populi-
stischen neuen Nationalismus und dem mangelnden Augenmerk auf die Notwendigkeit, die 
Demokratie aktiv zu verteidigen. Andererseits sind afrikanische soziale Bewegungen, die sich 
erfolgreich für eine demokratische Renaissance in Afrika und anderswo einsetzen, vielverspre-
chende Indikatoren für fortschrittliche soziale Kräfte, die globalen Trends des Wiederauflebens 
eines rechten Nationalismus und autokratischer Herrschaft entgegenwirken. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Since the early 1990s and the “second wind of change” in Africa (Engel et al. 1996), the tiny 
West African Republic of Benin, labelled the Quartier Latin of Francophone Africa, has been 
regarded as a model democracy for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, Benin made 
history by becoming the first African country to overthrow a military dictator by democratic 
means (Kohnert & Preuss 1992: 70). The concept of a Sovereign National Conference of rep-
resentatives of all active forces of the Nation became a model for a peaceful transition to fol-
low in the whole of Francophone Africa and beyond (Brown & Kaiser 2007; Eboussi Boulaga 
2009; Gisselquist 2008; Heilbrunn 1995; Kohnert 1997; Ngenge 2019). 
 
This image of Benin has recently changed radically within three months. Inside and outside 
the country, people are stunned after the ‘exclusive’ parliamentary elections of April 2019: 
The "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" complains: "Benin - a former model state is becoming a sham 
democracy" (Burri 2019). "Africa confidential" (2019) is laconically accusing the current 
president: "Talon turns back the clock". "The fatal trap?", asks the Civic Academy for Africa's 
Future (CIAAF 2019). These are just a few of the reactions from inside and outside the coun-
try that illustrate how much hopes for further democratic development have been disappoint-
ed. What had happened? 
 
 
2. “EXCLUSIVE” PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 2019:  
THE END OF AFRICA’S MODEL DEMOCRACY? 
 
On 28 April 2019, five million voters were called upon to elect the deputies for the "Assem-
blée Nationale", the Beninese parliament. The 83 elected representatives belong to two par-
ties, the "Bloc Républicain" and the "Union Progressiste". Both groups – in their respective 
party constellations until the change of the Charter of the Political Parties - are close to cur-
rent President Patrice Talon and have supported his government since he took office in 2016.3 
Excluded from the elections were five other (mostly opposition) parties, which - according to 
the verdict of the state election authority, the Autonomous National Electoral Commission 
(CENA) - had not qualified sufficiently for participation. In the run-up to the ballot, this 
sparked a passionate public debate. If one believes Beninese intellectuals, there has been no 
comparable crisis of democracy since the overcoming of the ‘Marxist-Leninist’ one-party 
state 30 years ago and the introduction of democratic institutions. Many fear that the Presi-
dent, with the help of the parliamentary groups that support him, will be able to decide on all 
constitutional amendments in the future to secure more presidential rights and thus greater 
power in the implementation of the reforms he is striving for. In the past, attempts in this di-
rection had failed because of the resistance in parliament and the constitutional court, which 
were afraid of the head of state’s overpowering supremacy. 
 
The President himself does not see democracy at risk. On the one hand, he said before the 
elections that there will be other elections in the next few years (2020 communal elections, 
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2021 presidential elections), in which an opposition that may then have become stronger will 
be able to participate. On the other hand, he argued that the two blocs admitted to the elec-
tions were formed by a large number of different parties so that a certain representativeness 
was still maintained. And finally, he held that life would go on without the excluded parties 
anyway.4 
 
How did it get this far? In the beginning, there was, firstly, a change to the Charter of Political 
Parties adopted by the National Assembly in July 2018 (Présidence de la République 2018a). 
The laudable objective of the reform was to anchor the political parties more broadly on the 
entire national territory and thus to achieve a higher threshold for ethnically or regionally ori-
ented associations. This was to be achieved primarily by recruiting 15 "founding members" in 
each community, i.e. 1,155 "membres fondateurs" per party nationwide. 
 
In September 2018, the deputies then, secondly, adopted the new electoral law (Présidence de 
la République 2018b). The aim here was to end the fragmentation of the party landscape 
(more than 200 parties to date) and to promote the formation of larger political blocs (BBC 
2019). From the 397 paragraphs of the law, it stands out that each party must achieve at least 
10 % of all votes to win seats in the National Assembly. Moreover, the deposit of the equiva-
lent of about 380,000 € is required as a prerequisite for admission to the election.  
Thirdly, in February 2019, the Constitutional Court ruled that the parties must submit a "Cer-
tificate of Conformity", issued by the Ministry of the Interior (Commission Electorale Natio-
nale Autonome 2019), in addition to the documents to be submitted to the electoral authority. 
As a result of the examination of the candidatures by the electoral authority, only two parties 
were accepted, whose documents were allegedly marked by "minor irregularities" only. The 
documents of all other competitors apparently showed intolerable deficits, which led to their 
disqualification.5 
 
Attempts to resolve the situation prior to the ballot have taken place on many levels. Neither 
the President nor the Constitutional Court saw themselves in a position to contribute to greater 
representativeness of the ballot through their own interventions. The National Assembly was 
also unable to do anything: In principle, a consensual exegesis of the laws and ordinances by 
parliament would - following the constitution - have allowed modifications to the admission 
of the parties. But the opposition and the presidential "Bloc Majoritaire" did not want to agree 
on a flexible interpretation of electoral law or to change existing laws in favour of an "inclu-
sive" election. Both sides remained unyielding; "gambled away", some say; "perfidiously 
hatched", others complain. Thus, the election day came with no real choice for the voters. 
To prevent a threatened boycott of larger sections of the population, the government's news-
paper "La Nation" published a precautionary article two days before the elections, threatening 
each person with imprisonment and fines who incites others to abstain from voting, possibly 
using "false information" (La Nation 2019). On election day itself, the Internet was shut down 
without giving any reason (Amnesty International 2019). After all, the "exclusive" election 
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and the opposing position of many well-known personalities in public life seems to have pre-
vented many citizens from voting (Le Monde 2019): According to the electoral authority, vot-
er turnout was well below 30 %, which compared unfavourably with over 66 % in the last 
parliamentary elections. In fact, the turn-out was at its lowest level since the democratic re-
newal in 1990.6 
 
In the weeks after the elections, civil unrest and violence broke out in several parts of the 
country leading to fatal incidents and the detention of several adversaries to the government. 
Attempts by local fief holders, religious leaders and elder statesmen from other West African 
countries to solve the post-electoral crisis have not yet lead to viable results.  
Thus, the elections in Benin took place for the first time since the end of the dictatorship and 
the subsequent "renouveau démocratique" under exclusion of the opposition. Is the "Benin 
model" at its end, an example which, despite the little geopolitical and economic importance 
of the country with only eleven million inhabitants, inspired many other democratic move-
ments in Africa? The democracy: "en panne"? Social peace: endangered? 
 
 
3. THE EROSION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS BEHIND A CONSTITUTIONAL FAÇADE 
 
The domestic political development of the past 30 years in Benin shows signs of a decline in 
democratic achievements that did not begin with the assumption of office by the current pres-
ident in 2016. Rather, creeping erosion of democracy can be observed. This corresponds to a 
lengthy worldwide ‘democratic recession’ since about 2006, which has been observed also by 
Diamond (2015) and others (Wantchekon 2017). Since a decade, established democracies 
increasingly perform poorly and show a lack of will and self-confidence to promote democra-
cy effectively (Diamond 2015: 144).  
 
Graph 1: Freedom and Governance Trends in Africa, 2005–13  
   
Source: Diamond 2015: 149  
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The decline in the quality of democratic institutions and freedom scores apparently was espe-
cially pronounced in Africa, whereby the pace of decay in democratic institutions may even 
have been underestimated because it was not always evident to outside observers. One of the 
main reasons for this decline was the especially poor performance in good governance (the 
rule of law and transparency) which was even worse than the deterioration in political rights 
and civil liberties (Diamond 2015: 148; see graph 1). Poor governance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
was closely linked with the resurgence of ‘neo-patrimonialism’, that is with autocratic leaders, 
supported by the ruling parties, who wanted to amass political and economic power for them-
selves, their clans and supporters. They relied – often virtually unopposed - on getting away 
with eroding checks and balances, undermining institutions of accountability, exceeding pres-
idential term limits etc. (Diamond 2015: 149, 151-152). This is in stark contrast to the general 
high esteem many Africans have for Western-style multi-party democracy, political accounta-
bility, rule of law and transparency (Diamond 2015: 153).  
 
Diamond's analysis was complemented and deepened by Levitsky & Ziblatt (2018) in their 
publication "How democracies die". In their thought-provoking study, they showed that de-
mocracies, e.g. in Europe and South America, did not die from violent coups, but more com-
monly from a gradual slide into authoritarianism by steadily reducing civil liberties, restrict-
ing the diversity of press and opinion, and changing the rules in favour of the current rulers. 
Moreover, democracies don't die just by themselves, as a rule, they are killed (Jones 2018). 
There must be actors responsible for it!  
 
Graph 2: Benin compared with Togo 
   
Source: BTI (2018) – Benin = blue, Togo = red 
Parallels are obvious, although Benin compared still favourably with neighbouring West Afri-
can states like Togo until 2018. Benin matched rather with Ghana or Senegal, as demonstrated 
by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) country reports 2018 (BTI 2018).  
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Although the BTI Benin country report of 2018 confirmed still that Benin counted among the 
most stable democratic systems in West Africa, and confirmed that its democratic institutions 
in the country function well, at least at the national level (BTI-Benin 2018, chapter 4: 4 Sta-
bility of Democratic Institutions), things apparently deteriorated partly unnoticed in between.  
 
In Benin, the right to strike has been curtailed for a year now. The dismissal of civil servants 
and state employees has also been made easier. With the ban on the print edition of "La 
Nouvelle Tribune" in 2018, the country's most widely read critical newspaper, the press has 
lost a prestigious voice. In the 2019 Annual Report of Reporters sans Frontières, Benin, that 
ranked 84th a year ago, fell twelve places to rank 96 of a total of 180 countries (Reporters sans 
frontières 2019). The most recent Africa Media Barometer Benin (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
2019) states: “Self-censorship is a common practice among journalists and results from dif-
ferent forms of pressure that they are subject to, including pressure from their supervisors and 
their employers.” According to the current report by Freedom House, Benin is still considered 
"free", but in 2018 it had to give up three more points of its 82 held so far (Freedom House 
2019).  
Graph 3: Benin compared with Ghana 
   
Source: BTI (2018) – Benin = blue, Ghana = red 
 
The decisive factors for this downgrade were that in June 2018 President Talon appointed his 
personal lawyer as President of the Constitutional Court, that the right to strike was severely 
restricted, and that the president's worst political rival, Sébastien Ajavon, was sentenced in 
absentia to 20 years in prison. This sentence has not yet been revoked despite a ruling to the 
contrary by the African Court of Human Rights in Arusha, Tanzania. Mo Ibrahim, well 
known for his support to good governance in Africa, condemns the present state of democracy 
in Benin and the role of its president with harsh words: “What he is doing against his oppo-
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nents is deplorable. He is supposed to be a sophisticated man, a great entrepreneur, a liberal, 
both economically and politically. How did he turn into a dictator?”7 
 
However, both democratization as well as economic recovery, have been hampered since the 
beginning by the underlying fabric of socio-cultural neo-patrimonial structures of clientelism 
and patronage, i.e. of vested interests of the power elite and rival strategic groups. Our state-
ment of 1992 still holds today: As long as the material and socio-cultural development of the 
country has not progressed so far that politicians and their electorate can act independently of 
patronage relations and rent-seeking from foreign aid or other sources, a real democratization 
of Beninese society, which is based on Western models, is not to be expected (Kohnert & 
Preuss 1992: 66-67). To discuss the erosion of democratic institutions in Benin we will exam-
ine in the following section what happened to parliamentarianism in Benin since 1990, 
whether the separation of powers was effective, to what extent freedom of association was 
granted, and how freedom of expression was undermined step by step in the past. 
 
3.1 Many parties are no indicator of more democracy or strong parliamentarianism 
 
The constitution of December 1990 established an outstanding legal framework for a presi-
dential multiparty system in Benin (Kohnert 1997). The proliferation of political parties in the 
following decades reached such dimensions that it was questionable whether all of these par-
ties served the interest of the development of the country or whether they worked mainly for 
the pursuit of personal interests of their leaders, considered to be their private property.8 This 
the more so, because political "transhumance", i.e. political nomadism from one party affilia-
tion to another, depending on the attractiveness of ‘pastures’, irrespective of the political pro-
gram, has been common. In consequence, political groupings in Benin tended to be fluid and 
fast-changing (EIU 2018: 12).9 
 
Since the democratic renewal, there have been more than 30 years of regular elections at the 
local and national level for the election of local councils, parliament and the presidency. The 
number of political parties has multiplied, but few structures have survived at the national 
level. Rather, public figures, known for their international experience, political profile or eco-
nomic success form groups under their leadership. Their political program, if any, depends on 
the occasionally volatile orientation of their leaders. 
Once elected to the National Assembly, these groups form larger blocs, mostly as a result of a 
negotiation process between the respective leaders and the current president. All heads of 
state of the Benin republic have thus far been able to secure the necessary majority for legisla-
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 Interview led by Sylvestre-Treiner (2019: 24). Original quote: "Ce qu'il fait contre ses opposants est déplorable. 
Il est censé d'être un homme sophistiqué, un grand entrepreneur, un libéral, tant d'un point de vue économique 
que politique. Comment s'est-il transformé en dictateur?" (English Translation by the authors).   
8
 A detailed analysis of the failures of the ‘political system' in Benin from the perspective of the pro-presidential 
faction was given by Lazare Séhouéto, minister under President Mathieu Kérékou, and one of the four candi-
dates of the Force Clé elected in the 2007 parliamentary election, now one of the speakers of Patrice Talon, on 
occasion of the vote on the new electoral code. In particular, he explained his view on topics such as tax clear-
ance, partisan system, bonds to be a candidate in the presidential election (ORTB 2018).  
9
 Afize Adamon provides an in-depth analysis of what happened between 1990 and 2015 in the National Assem-
bly (cf. Adamon & Amoussou 2016; Adamon 2016).  
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tive proposals or personnel decisions. The National Assembly's own initiatives are rare, com-
pared to those of the government. As a rule, members of parliament have no trained staff who 
can competently deal with political, economic, social or other issues. The parliament also 
does not have a technical apparatus that could support the representatives in their tasks. 
 
The confidence of Benin’s citizens in political parties and their elected representatives is rela-
tively low. A representative survey conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in 2018 found 
that only 21 % of those surveyed had some or a great deal of confidence in the work of politi-
cal parties. After all, just 40 % trust the National Assembly to deal with their priority prob-
lems (Preuss 2019b, forthcoming).10 Parties and parliament thus have neither the personnel 
nor the brainpower to critically accompany the work of the government. Their support among 
the population is low. 
 
3.2 The judiciary does not control political power effectively 
 
In functioning democracies, the judiciary represents an important corrective to securing the 
rule of law in government and administration. In Benin, the most important organizations are 
the Constitutional Court in Cotonou and the Supreme Court in the capital Porto Novo, which 
have the power to stop the executive branch. The members of these bodies are elected by Par-
liament and the President for a five-year term each; they may be re-elected once. 
 
To exert their function, they must be independent of government. In small countries like Be-
nin, it is almost impossible for members of the local elites not to know each other, because 
they have visited the same schools and universities, served in the same institutions, or have 
family and/or professional relationships. Thus, networks play an important role. Stroh (2018: 
600-615) describes to what extent Benin's presidents have used their nomination power be-
tween 1993 and 2013 to “streamline” the highest courts of their country using a social net-
work analysis tool that analyses personal relationships between politicians in power and judg-
es in the Constitutional Court. He identified an ever-increasing closeness between the presi-
dential camp and the judges in office. Thus, under the second term of President Talon’s pre-
decessor Boni Yayi, there were no more judges who could be attributed to the opposition. 
And despite the fact that a profound analysis of the new Constitutional Court which took of-
fice in 2018 is still pending it can be predicted that this institution led by the former Minister 
of Justice and personal advocate of President Talon will not easily win credibility and reputa-
tion.11 
 
A growing number of “political” sentences by various high courts during the last months con-
tribute to the impression that the judiciary is less and less independent and serves as an in-
strument of the government to exclude opposing forces and persons from power. One recent 
example is the verdict against Lionel Zinsou, one of the competitors of President Talon in the 
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2016 presidential elections, who was sentenced for forgery and exceeding campaign expenses 
to five years ineligibility and six years in prison in August 2019 without any proof of the alle-
gations made. With the changes described above, the judiciary is obviously neither willing nor 
in a position to oppose any unconstitutional action by the government. 
 
3.3 Freedom of coalition: lack of politically interested civil society organisations and 
powerful trade unions 
 
Although Benin has had a strong tradition of blossoming civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and trade unions dating back up to the times of the Marxist-Leninist Kérékou regime, as well 
as a Catholic Church that intervened in the process of democratization in decisive moments 
like the advent of the Sovereign National Conference in 1990, the freedom of coalition has 
been endangered in recent years. This is due to a great extent to the increasing formalization 
and bureaucratization of associative activity in the country which has been promoted by the 
ruling parties under the reign of Boni Yayi and Patrice Talon. Although the Beninese are 
proud of their associative competence and activity that climaxed in the peaceful overturn of 
the Kérékou government by a populist mass-movement they apparently have become less 
interested to actively defend the democratic achievements of the past decades and concentrate 
on humanitarian and charitable activities.  
 
Still in 2013, CSOs like the Citizens’ Alternative coalition, employing their so-called Red 
Wednesday demonstrations, successfully defended the legal presidential two-term limit set by 
the constitution against the intention of Boni Yayi to extend it (BTI 2018. Benin country re-
port, Chapter: Governance - I. Level of Difficulty). Prominent actors of civil society and so-
cial media are often lured into profitable positions by the government. Although this practice 
started already under the reign of Boni Yayi, it has been perfected by the government of Pa-
trice Talon who came to power last, but not least, because of the support of CSOs. Thus, a 
CSO led by the professor Joseph Djogbénou mutated into a political party and played a major 
role during the 2016 presidential elections (BTI 2018). 
 
Trade Unions do not have a strong position as the workers, employees and civil servants they 
represent are a minority compared to the mass of workers and self-employed people in the 
informal sector. However, strikes of teachers, health personnel and judges could heavily in-
fluence the functioning of government facilities in the past. Trade union rights are enshrined 
in the Beninese Constitution, labour law and civil service law. They guarantee freedom of 
association and allow all workers to form or join trade unions. Despite this clear legal frame-
work, the reality in Benin is now different. After 2017, two new laws were passed due to re-
peated strikes in the civil service of the country, which make it considerably more difficult to 
represent the interests of employees. E.g., the limitation of the duration of strikes to a maxi-
mum of ten days per year is a significant restriction on the rights granted by the Constitution. 
And the law on the conclusion and termination of employment contracts, which aims to make 
the labour market more flexible and encourage foreign investment, calls into question the job 
security of workers and intimidates even members of trade unions. Since the democratic re-
construction of the country, there have been no comparable restrictions on trade union rights. 
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If proof of the weakness of the Beninese trade unions was needed, the more or less conflict-
free enforcement of these laws and regulations is an eloquent expression of the inability of 
workers' representatives to demand their rights.  
 
Demonstrations that previously only had to be registered must now be approved by the local 
authorities. The first victim of this change was the communist trade union, which naturally 
wanted to carry out its traditional procession on 1 May. After a tear gas operation by the po-
lice, the event was over. Civil society and trade unions as important actors for democracy and 
civil rights have thus been weakened considerably during the previous years.    
 
3.4 Freedom of expression: high diversity of opinions ceased to exist 
 
In Benin, most people still rely on radio and TV for their information (Afrobarometer 2019) 
because many citizens cannot read and the print-media is mostly restricted to urban areas. 
Whereas TV is restricted to urban areas, radio reception covers about 80 % of the national 
territory. Yet, the new social media are advancing fast because of a relatively high penetration 
rate of mobile phones (45 % in 2017; cf. GSMA Intelligence 2017). However, since the im-
plementation of the Intelligence Act (Présidence de la République 2018c), the fear spread that 
one could be wiretapped by the security services. A fear that concerned not only journalists 
and whistleblowers but also ordinary citizens and even government officials. An increasing 
number of citizens, therefore, use more secure applications such as Signal and WhatsApp. Yet, 
the concerned public knows very well that in the case of need, public authorities would not 
refrain from blocking sites hosted within the country through the long-established operator 
Benin Telecom (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2019).  
 
Benin has a vibrant media landscape, largely restricted to urban areas, including two public, 
seven private TV- as well as over 50 radio stations and more than 170 newspapers. However, 
many of the media refrain from openly criticizing the government because of fear of reprisal. 
In 2015 already, the National Assembly passed a law that reintroduced the offence of "insult-
ing the majesty", i.e. making a violation of the very broad personal rights of the president and 
other official representatives of the government a punishable offence (Assemblée Nationale 
2015).  
 
However, it has to be admitted that the professional ethics of Benin’s journalists still leave a 
lot to be desired. They frequently mix facts and opinions. They are supervised by the Media 
Ethics Observatory (ODEM), created in 1999 that has the task to enforce the Code of Ethics, 
which will be revised in 2019. The High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication 
(HAAC), a quasi-governmental institution, has the somewhat contradictory role of both guar-
anteeing freedom of expression of the media, but also as a watchdog to prevent the press from 
behaving in an “irresponsible” or “destabilizing” way (US Department of State 2019: 7-8). In 
case of doubt, it is more likely that it reacts in a government-friendly way.  
 
In recent years, the citizen's respect for the HAAC declined because it has lost its impartiality 
according to public opinion, last, but not least, because of the peculiarities of appointment of 
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members of the institution which has been biased in favour of the head of state (BTI 2018). 
Thus, on 24 May 2018, the HAAC suspended the daily newspaper La Nouvelle Tribune for 
publishing “abusive, outrageous, detrimental, and intrusive” information on the president’s 
private life (ibid). The base and background for these harsh measures apparently was the re-
introduction of the offence of insult of the President into the Penal Code (Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung 2019). Another case of muffling the media occurred already in 2016 when the HAAC 
suspended the TV station Sikka TV. This decision was revoked by the Court of Cotonou in 
May 2107, but the Court forbade Sikka TV to resume direct broadcasting. Nevertheless, it 
continued broadcasting via satellite and internet (ibid). The creation of websites offering 
broadcasting and written media has to be formally authorised by the HAAC, however, this 
authorization is not required for creating and hosting blogs. 
 
3.5 Civil rights and democracy in Benin: more illusion than reality 
 
On the surface, democratic institutions and civil rights are respected in Benin. But behind a 
beautiful façade, the limits of civil liberties and shortcomings in governance become apparent, 
which attest to the considerable shortcomings of the Benin model. In the next section we will 
examine whether the existing system has at least made economic progress possible for the 
population. 
 
 
4 A DEMOCRATIC DIVIDEND FOR THE POPULATION NOT IN SIGHT  
 
Mo Ibrahim, the promoter of good governance in Africa unveiled in an interview what he 
thinks democracy signifies for poor people: “When a woman fails to feed her family, do you 
really think she is concerned about democracy in her country first? I don't think so. Her prob-
lem is first of all to eat, to educate her children, to get her husband treated. Democracy only 
comes after that.”12 
 
Is democracy something that has had a positive impact on Benin's population, in particular, 
the poorer strata? In general terms, inclusive economic development should generate the fol-
lowing outcomes: i) increasing the productivity of labour, ii) enhancing the quality of life of 
poor people by granting them access to productive resources and social services e.g. health 
services, drinking water, sanitation, and education; iii) narrowing the gender gap; iv) assuring 
the sustainability of the economy and the environment. What is the record of Benin’s gov-
ernments since 1990, and does there exist a significant difference in this respect to other de-
veloping countries in Africa?  
 
Benin remains at the bottom of international social and economic indices. Foreign outstanding 
debts, which were considerably reduced following debt relief through the HIPC initiative, are 
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growing again, even though the burden of debt service is currently still low (World Bank 
2018; African Development Bank 2019: 19) and well below West African average. The ef-
fects of a partially dynamic economic development have been partially compensated by popu-
lation growth; the remainder of the surplus is distributed to members of a growing middle 
class, especially in the urban centres in Southern Benin. In recent years, distributional ine-
quality in the country has continued to rise: The Gini index as a measure of inequality rose 
from 38.6 in 2003 to 47.8 in 2015 and is one of the highest in West Africa (World Bank 
2019). 
 
There is not much to distribute: the government expenditure (2018) is approximately 2,1 bn 
Euros (this amount corresponds to the annual budget of the city of Hanover in Germany) of 
which more than 50 % is spent on the salaries and pensions of (retired) state employees, sub-
sidies for state firms and decentralised entities, and the interest for outstanding debts (Direc-
tion Générale du Budget 2018). The budget deficit went down to 20 %, much lower than in 
previous years, and thus confirmed Benin’s fiscal consolidation path, bringing the country in 
compliance with the West African  Economic and Monetary Union’s (WAEMU) convergence 
criterion of 3 % of GDP (IMF 2019).  
 
Benin's state social policy is modest. Education and health expenditures (23 % and 7 %, re-
spectively) are inadequate, as in most of its neighbouring peers of the WAEMU. Greater pub-
lic spending efficiency and a more equitable geographical distribution of resources would 
pave the way for lower poverty rates and more inclusive growth (World Bank 2019). A mini-
mum wage is fixed: it is 45,000 CFA francs per month (approx. 68 €) and thus hardly exceeds 
the two-US Dollar limit per day, which is considered the definition of extreme poverty. Also, 
most people do not benefit from this because they are informally employed or engaged in sub-
sistence farming.  
 
State requirements regarding working hours or health standards are rarely enforced. Progress 
has been made in school policy. School enrolment has been significantly increased in the last 
decade, reducing child labour. This is particularly relevant since Benin still had an enormous-
ly high proportion of illiterate students in 2015, at 61.6 % of the population. The older popula-
tion over 60, in particular, has hardly developed any literacy skills, which has brought the 
country to an inglorious seventh place on the global country index in terms of illiteracy rates. 
The overall picture remains gloomy, especially as regards the increasing share of extreme 
poverty and malnutrition. All in all, Benin numbers among Africa’s relative winners in eco-
nomic growth, but growth is not inclusive. The state is only marginally capable to fulfil its 
social obligation to society as a whole and is mainly relying on the formal sector. The Ber-
telsmann Transformation Index for Benin (BTI 2018) rates states welfare policy as three (out 
of ten) and socioeconomic transformation even lower as two.  
 
5 REMEDIES: A NEW CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY OR JUST GOOD GOVERNANCE ?  
 
Since the call for an African Renaissance by Thabo Mbeki in 1998 ‘African’ solutions be-
came fashionable again to answer problems of the second wave of democratization in Africa. 
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One of its key intellectual advocates was the renowned Kenyan historian, philosopher and 
political writer, late Ali A. Mazrui, director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at 
Binghamton University (New York), and of the Center for Afro-American and African Stud-
ies, Michigan University. In his publications on the African democracide (Mazrui & Wiafe-
Amoako 2015: 17)13 he put forward a concept of a cultural re-adjustment of African institu-
tions to counteract the ‘murder’ of democracy and to promote true democratic development in 
Africa. 
 
According to Mazrui “democracy in Africa was killed by multiple assassins” (Mazrui & 
Wiafe-Amoako 2015: 17). First, and foremost by “the spy who came in from the cold”, i.e. 
Western powers who pampered African autocratic regimes in the times of the Cold War as 
long as they joined the ranks of the global crusade against ‘communism’. However, according 
to him, the most crucial problem to be solved would be a cultural re-adjustment (Mazrui & 
Wiafe-Amoako 2015: 24), including an Africanisation of laws and rules about corruption and 
nepotism. Certain forms of ethnic nepotism should be handled with a greater understanding 
for African customs. They should not be generally outlawed but regulated while tougher pen-
alties for bribery would be needed (Mazrui & Wiafe-Amoako 2015: 21). Moreover, he de-
plores that African democracies mostly do not honour sufficiently their cultural heritage. In-
stead, African democracy should be firmly rooted in its indigenous religion. It should come 
out openly and include African traditional beliefs for example in curriculums of schools, cele-
brate public religious holidays dedicated to African religions, etc. to render African democra-
cy more viable and sustainable (Mazrui & Wiafe-Amoako 2015: 21). 
 
In so far as this call for a cultural re-adjustment concerns the recognition of ethnic, cultural, 
and linguistic distinctions as well as certain collective-, in addition to individual rights, it 
would be shared by other scholars too (Fye & Senghor 2016). Path-breaking re-adjustments of 
autocratic regimes in Africa by Sovereign National Conferences, for example, have been 
widely recognised as unique, popular and inclusive, i.e. typically African representations of 
the general (public) will (volonté générale in French political philosophy) of the people. This 
would offer more sustainable solutions than to blindly following democratic multi-party elec-
tions according to the Western model. An Africanization of democracy has been demanded 
also by Rocha & Khuon (2018) concerning a better control of good governance and accounta-
bility by other legitimate means of democratic control through ‘democratic projects’, like en-
hanced involvement of Civil Society Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
However, beyond these commonly shared arenas of legitimate public decision-making as a 
facilitator of sustainable democratization, Mazrui’s call for an Africanised cultural re-
adjustment becomes highly problematic, if not delusive. You only have to recall the wave of 
autocratization of African regimes, for example by the notorious despots Mobutu Sese Seko 
(Congo), Eyadéma Gnassingbé (Togo) and Gabon’s Omar Bongo, under the cover of African-
ization- and Authenticité-campaigns in the 1970s (Adelman 1975; Senghor 2009). In Benin 
autocratization with recourse to use and customs became infamous as well when dictator 
Mathieu Kérekou re-labelled the former French colony Dahomey to a supposedly ‘Marxist-
                                                 
13
 The quoted text is the updated version of a former article by Mazrui (2002: 15-23). 
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Leninist’ Republic of Bénin. Later on, in the aftermath of the second democratization of Afri-
ca, the politics of Africanization were again misused by autocrats to legitimate their ambitions 
as showed in the following, taking three examples from West Africa, Benin, Togo, and Sene-
gal. 
 
On the other hand, there are recent examples of African social movements of overwhelmingly 
young activists who successfully campaigned for a democratic renaissance in Africa, like Y’en 
a marre (Senegal) and Balai citoyen in Burkina Faso. Therefore, an additional focus will be 
on the question whether these social movements or other African initiatives, like the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) implemented within the framework of NEPAD in 2003, could provide the right an-
swers to counter global trends for the resurgence of right-wing nationalism and autocratic 
rule. This is of considerable importance, because the new nationalism in Africa and elsewhere 
contributes directly to the stealthy democracide. It shows remarkable differences both in its 
roots and its impact, compared with the surge of patriotic feelings of the national independ-
ence movements of the early 1960s. Contrary to the 'first' nationalism, the 'second' is less 
prone to include, tending rather exclude populations. Alienation, xenophobia and its political 
instrumentalization are its curses. The new nationalism has been shaped decisively by the 
consequences of globalisation and by the increasing cleavage between the poor and the rich. 
Nowadays, structures of nationalism and nation-states differ more than in the past. Frequently, 
the new nationalism is rooted in populist grass-roots movements which do not necessarily 
share the same interest as the ruling class or the state. This makes for its extraordinary politi-
cal and social ambiguity and brisance (Kohnert 2009). 
 
 
6. CASE STUDIES OF BENIN, TOGO AND SENEGAL 
 
6.1 Benin 
 
In Benin, democratic renewal had been promoted by a 'return of the religious' (Kohnert 2007). 
Sure, it would be misleading to put the blame for lacking development and democratization in 
Africa on the cultural heritage, as supposedly incorporated in ‘traditional African institutions’, 
which are frequently considered in a simplistic and deterministic manner as a customary bar-
rier to democratization or economic growth (Kohnert 2011: 4). A significant number of de-
mocratization processes were inspired by popular religious movements for democratization 
and human rights, as by the liberation theology in Latin America since the 1970s. An enlight-
ened vodun (including its Afro-American equivalent), combined with related different denom-
inations of Christian orientation, can have positive effects on democratic transition and em-
powerment of the poor. Benin was the first African country to recognise by law its African 
traditional religion vodun as an integral part of Benin’s cultural heritage under president Ni-
cephore Soglo in 1991 (Kohnert 2007; Crofford 2015). It is held to be a prime example of a 
democratic renewal promoted by religious institutions with the prominent part of the Arch-
bishop of Cotonou in the Sovereign National Conference of 1990, supported by representa-
tives of all institutions of the country, including chief priests of the vodun communities (May-
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rargue 1997; Kohnert 2007). However, whether the recourse to vodun has aided the democra-
tization process to become sustainable is open to question. In the end, both presidents, Soglo 
and Kérékou, who instrumentalised vodun as means of political mobilization for their particu-
lar interests, did not promote democratization but rather the contrary (Kadya Tall 1995; May-
rargue 1997; Kohnert 2011). Later on, however, Benin politics were reduced to the "survival 
(or ‘consolidation') of minimal democracy", as Gisselquist (2018: 790) called it euphemisti-
cally.   
 
The logic of political power requires that the use of traditional African politic-magic belief 
systems to enhance one's political standing implies necessarily too to pay respect to these in-
stitutions to the detriment of democratic legitimacy (Kadya Tall 1995: 207). Thus, occult be-
lief systems, notably the vodun and the belief in magic and witchcraft, played an ambiguous 
role in Benin's development process (Kohnert 1996: 1351). On the eve of the electoral cam-
paign for the presidential elections in 1991, for example, the contender of dictator M. Kér-
ékou, and subsequent winner of the elections, Nicéphore Soglo, was apparently empoisoned 
and nearly died. The crime was attributed to political adversaries of Soglo, who were accused 
of employing witchcraft with the help of vodun ‘witch doctors’ (Kohnert 2011: 10). Thus, 
vodun-politics assumed dimensions of a notorious special feature in Benin.  
 
In October 2012, Patrice Talon a wealthy cotton magnate who had gained a fortune with ferti-
lizer trade and West African cotton, and former ally of President Thomas Boni Yayi, fell out 
with the leader. Talon – who’s wealth ranked among the 15th largest fortunes of Francophone 
Sub-Sahara Africa in the 2015 - had been for a long time one of the main supporters of the 
President. In 2006, he sponsored, for example, the first election campaign of Yayi. According 
to rumours, Talon had allegedly been rewarded for his loyalty by large-scale corruption and 
nepotism to his advantage. Thus, for example, in 2008, he won the tender for the privatization 
of the cotton division of Sonapra, the National Society for Agricultural Promotion which pro-
vided about 45 % of the tax revenues and 80 % of export earnings of the state. Two months 
before the next elections of 2012 Talon gained another tender to manage the customs duties of 
the port of Cotonou, whose annual revenues of about € 1.5 billion per year, were the equiva-
lent of the state budget (Malagardis 2016). But then Talon became for reasons which are hard-
ly comprehensible for outsiders Yayi’s enemy and was suspected to be the mastermind behind 
a poison attack on the president. In December, Talon and his alleged accomplices were arrest-
ed in Paris, following an international arrest warrant issued by the general prosecutor in Coto-
nou. However, in May 2013 a Beninese judge dismissed the case. He was subsequently ar-
rested but could manage to escape and fled to the United States. France, on the other hand, 
refused twice to extradite Talon (Banégas 2014). The affair grew more complex when Talon 
was accused of complicity in an attempted coup by Colonel Pamphile Zomahoun and Johan-
nes Dagnon to overthrow President Yayi on March 4, 2013. But meanwhile, the affair seemed 
to have been buried, because Yayi had granted pardon to Talon, following mediation by the 
former Senegalese President Abdou Diouf (Duhem 2016). Nevertheless, the poisoning-case 
was re-opened by a French court of justice in June 2014. The judicial investigation was still 
pending in Paris in 2016 (Malagardis 2016). In Cotonou, however, the case was closed in 
2015 and Talon could return from his exile in France to Benin. Candidate for the 2016 presi-
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dential election, he won the second round of the presidentials (65.37 % against 34.63 %) 
against his competitor, Lionel Zinsou.  
 
6.2 Togo 
 
The second example to test Mazrui's thesis on cultural-adjustment as a prerequisite of a viable 
African democracy is Togo. Togo's history demonstrates arguably the most extreme form of 
an African autocracy and would-be democracy under the cover of cultural adjustment. The 
ruling Gnassingbé-clan, in power since over four decades, is the longest-ruling dynasty of the 
world besides the North Korean dynasty. It cultivated since the ‘authenticity' campaigns of the 
1970s – assisted by its Korean advisors - a grotesque personality cult with reference to Afri-
can customs (Decalo 1996: 232). Over decades, the security services as well as commanding 
heights of the government and public offices were exceedingly ethnicised and staffed with 
followers of the dictator, i.e. Kabye, the same ethnic affiliation as the incumbent (Toulabor 
2005). Late dictator Eyadéma once summed it up himself, in saying that according to estab-
lished African tradition "there can’t be two male crocodiles in the same swamp".14 After his 
sudden death in 2005, Faure Gnassingbé, one of his sons was installed as heir to the throne by 
the military. Coerced by the opposition and the international community he agreed to hold 
multi-party elections. The latter, however, were sham elections right from the beginning. Still, 
up-to-date Togo is a ‘façade democracy' according to international standards (Kohnert 2019). 
 
6.3 Senegal 
As for Senegal that has long been sold as a showcase of democracy in Africa, including 
peaceful political alternance, things changed fundamentally with the Senegalese presidentials 
of 2019 that brought new configurations. One of the major issues was political side-switching 
that had been elevated, with recourse to established cultural traditions, to the rank of religion 
in defiance of morality. Political transhumance, i.e. political nomadism from one party affilia-
tion to another, depending on the attractiveness of ‘pastures’, had become so widespread in 
Senegal’s political history that the country had been renowned already internationally for this 
questionable practice (Kohnert & Marfaing 2019). Although it is still chastised as betrayal 
and morally repugnant if it concerns the political adversary, in reality, political transhumance 
has become more and more commonplace. It does not bother anyone, last, but not least, be-
cause party programs are still considered as paper-waste by many voters, and political ideolo-
gy, whether socialist, liberal or conservative, is said to be increasingly irrelevant. What counts 
most, besides the individual political history, experience and charisma of the respective can-
didate, are religious, regional and ethnic affiliation and assets promised to the particular clien-
tele (Kohnert & Marfaing 2019).  
 
On the other hand, Mazrui's call for a cultural adaption of African models of democracy might 
be justified concerning the balance of power between formal political institutions, including 
                                                 
14
 "Les présidents autoritaires ont pu se réclamer d'un proverbe vraisemblablement apocryphe, selon lequel ‘il ne 
peut y avoir deux crocodiles mâles dans un même marigot‘, pour affirmer leur suprématie personnelle" (Bayart 
2009: 29).  
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the parliament and government, and informal populist political social networking by youth 
movements and civil society groups. The latter currently strive, notably in West Africa, with 
recourse to a long history of African customs, e.g. of griots, travelling storytellers and advi-
sors who also dared to confront the emperor at his court with displeasing truth (Gueye 2013). 
In Senegal, the activists of Y’en a marre , which had been inspired by the successful Balai 
citoyen movement and youth culture in Burkina Faso15, made it clear, right from the begin-
ning, that their aim was not to topple the government or to compete with existing political 
parties. Instead, they envisaged changing society without recourse to violent actions and 
without taking power (Faye 2018: 77). The movement was originally founded, inter alia, by 
rappers Malal Almamy Tall aka ‘Fou malade’, Omar Toure aka ‘Thiat’ and Mbessane Seck 
aka ‘Kilifeu’ as well as journalists like Sheikh Fadel Barro and Aliou Sane (Mouvement Y’en 
a marre 2019). The youth movement ran from door to door to register young Senegalese to 
vote. They claimed that more than 300,000 voters were registered with their assistance and 
finally succeeded to oust President Abdoulaye Wade (ibid). Their vision, inspired by the lib-
eration-theory of the African philosopher and revolutionary Frantz Fanon, was a new type of 
Senegalese citizen (Faye 2018: 77, 80).  
 
 
7 CONCLUSION 
 
Benin and West Africa should not be considered in isolation, but their development must be 
seen in a regional and global context. The ‘democratic renewal’ in the small West African 
republic 30 years ago happened when the ‘iron curtain’ in Europe fell apart and state social-
ism lost its credibility as an economic and political model. The 'democratic recession' is not 
restricted to Sub-Saharan Africa alone and can be observed worldwide since the beginning of 
the 21st century. It went along with the rise of a populist new nationalism and lack of regard 
of the concerned for the need to defend democracy actively. It is therefore no wonder that 
autocratic tendencies can develop in the shadow of a worldwide mainstream. 
 
The lingering process of the decline of democratic institutions was driven by increasingly 
poor governance and disregard for the rule of law and transparency, which has been especially 
pronounced in African countries since the early 2000s. Good governance and inclusive eco-
nomic development are prerequisites for the construction and consolidation of democracies. 
For some time, undermined institutions may give the impression that there is no need to worry 
about democratic development. Formal elections are a necessary but not sufficient means to 
guarantee the participation of the population in political decisions.   
 
Recent examples of African social movements of predominantly young activists who success-
fully campaigned for a democratic renaissance in Africa and elsewhere may be promising 
indicators of progressive social forces that counteract global trends for the resurgence of right-
wing nationalism and autocratic rule.  
                                                 
15
 The Balai citoyen movement in Burkina Faso had been  instigated by reggae singer Karim Sama aka ‘Sams’K 
Le Jah’ and rap musician Serge Bambara aka ‘Smockey’ who protested against corruption, nepotism, human 
rights violations and bad government in their country (Commeilas 2015: 10). 
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European and other Western countries, struggling themselves with populist, nationalistic and 
anti-democratic movements cannot point to their alleged superiority in dialogue with develop-
ing countries, nor do they have miracle recipes for overcoming these challenges. Instead of 
concentrating on the outward appearance of a democratic form of government or multi-party 
elections, greater attention should be paid to good governance, social participation and inte-
gration. All together this should contribute to a continued and sustained process of building 
veritable democratic institutions which do not serve only as a constitutional façade, and con-
tribute to the formation of societal countervailing power. 
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